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The Language of Consent in Police Encounters
Janice Nadler
J.D. Trout
In this chapter, we examine the nature of conversations in citizen-police
encounters in which police seek to conduct a search based on the citizen’s consent. We
argue that when police officers ask a person if they can search, citizens often feel
enormous pressure to say yes. But judges routinely ignore these pressures, choosing
instead to spotlight the politeness and restraint of the officers’ language and demeanor.
Courts often analyze the language of police encounters as if the conversation has an
obvious, context-free meaning. The pragmatic features of language influence behavior,
but courts routinely ignore or deny this fact. Instead, current Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence assumes that the authority of armed police officers simply vanishes when
they pose their desire to search as a question. We discuss empirical evidence suggesting
that people are afraid to decline police officer requests to search, and conclude by
discussing the social and psychological cost of the widespread use of consent searches.
"A police officer who is certain to get his way has no need to shout."1

1. Introduction
In this chapter, we focus on public encounters between citizens and police officers in the
United States. More specifically, we examine encounters in which police question and
search citizens without probable cause or even reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
These encounters are legally permitted because courts deem them “consensual.” Legal
consent depends on whether a reasonable person, when confronted by the police, would
feel free to end the conversation, which itself turns in part on the nature of the
conversation and its context. It is these conversations, embedded in their social and
physical contexts, which we explore in this chapter.
We argue that when police officers seek permission to conduct a search, citizens
often feel enormous pressure to say yes. But in most criminal cases, judges do not
acknowledge these pressures, generally choosing instead to spotlight the politeness and
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restraint of the officers’ language and demeanor. By ignoring the pragmatic features of
the police-citizen encounter, judges are engaging in a systematic denial of the reality of
the social meaning underlying these encounters, and are thereby constructing a collective
legal myth designed to support current police practices in the “war on drugs.” Because
consent searches are very common, and because the vast majority of people subjected to
consent searches are innocent,2 the practice of conducting frequent consent searches
comes with social and political costs. It is possible that these costs are worthwhile, at
least in some cases, depending on the threat at hand. But the U.S. Supreme Court has
declined to engage in any serious analysis of this question. We begin with the practical
importance of consent searches as a crime investigation tool.

2. The Role of Consent Searches in Criminal Investigation
Law enforcement practices in the United States today frequently include on-the-fly
searches to detect evidence of crime. These searches are not a result of an ongoing
investigation, but rather the result of police acting on their instincts and training regarding
a person’s appearance or behavior or even presence in a particular place. For example, in
locations where intercity (e.g., Greyhound) buses make stopovers, local police sometimes
make a practice of boarding every bus as it arrives and requesting consent from
passengers to search their bags and/or their persons. In airports, law enforcement officers
use “drug courier profiles,” consisting of a list of behaviors and characteristics, to decide
which passengers to approach, question, and perhaps request consent to search for drugs.
Consent searches often follow on the heels of a routine traffic stop. Police pull
over drivers for burned out tail-lights, unsignaled lane changes, and speeding. Police
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incentives to attend to such administrative violations often rest not on the risk posed by
the violations themselves, but rather on the opportunity such stops provide for
investigating “suspicious” citizens. Which citizens appear suspicious is, of course, in the
eye of the beholder. Unfortunately, recently uncovered evidence demonstrates that the
race and ethnicity of the driver sometimes influence police judgments about which cars to
stop (Ayres 2008; Garcia & Long 2008).
The incentives to engage in this type of “drug interdiction” are now quite
powerful, with the advent of federal programs that pay large sums of money to local
police departments to fund the war on drugs (Bascuas 2007). As part of this federal
program, some small towns located near an interstate highway have generated millions
of dollars in revenue from seized cars and cash after local police succeeded in stopping
drivers transporting illegal drugs (Bascuas 2007). As a result, violations of minor traffic
violations are routinely parlayed into consent searches. Thus, the real purpose of many
traffic stops is drug interdiction, and minor traffic violations will suffice to justify such
stops, 3 even though minor violations are committed by virtually every driver on virtually
every trip.
In the absence of probable cause that a crime is being committed, officers rely on
the driver’s consent to find out what is in the car. In some localities, consent searches
have become routine, and are accomplished not only through traffic stops, but also by
boarding intercity buses and searching bags. As a tool for ferreting out possession
offenses, consent searches are extremely effective. First, consent searches permit police
to search when they otherwise would be prohibited from doing so. By some estimates,
over 90% of all searches are consent searches (Simmons 2005). Second, once police
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decide to request consent to search, they are remarkably successful in obtaining consent - one study found that over 95% of people asked to consent to a search did so.4 Third,
consent searches are low cost -- no investigation, wiretaps, warrants are needed. And
consent searches are effective in much the same way junk mail or spam email is effective.
If police stop and search enough people, it is just a matter of time until they find evidence
of crime. In the next section, we discuss the circumstances under which it is legally
permissible for the police to conduct a consent search.

3. Legal Standards for Consent Searches: The “Free to Terminate” Test
Government searches and seizures are governed by the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, which guarantees the “right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” A
search is likely to be considered reasonable if there is probable cause to believe that a
crime is being or has been committed. But in practice, police often search without
probable cause if the citizen has consented to the search.
To be valid, consent must be given voluntarily. If the citizen merely accedes to
the authority of the officer, then consent is not valid and the search is unreasonable.
Anything obtained during an unlawful search is excluded from evidence. Additionally, if
the police unlawfully seize someone, and then obtain consent to search, anything
obtained following the unlawful seizure is excluded. As a practical matter, excluding
contraband from evidence results in the dismissal of a charge of possessing that
contraband.
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The two key issues, then, are: 1) whether a consent search lacks sufficient
voluntariness, and 2) whether a person who consented to search had been unlawfully
seized. The first issue focuses on the extent to which a citizen’s consent to search was
voluntary or was the product of duress. The analysis requires the judge to decide, under
the totality of the circumstances, whether a reasonable person would have felt free to
refuse consent. To decide this question, courts examine, among other things, the manner
in which the police requested consent. If consent is requested in a manner that indicates
“to a reasonable person that he or she was free to refuse,”5 courts consider this to be
strong evidence the search was consensual. Courts point to factors such as the police
speaking in a polite manner, and asking for permission to search, as indications that the
person voluntarily consented. We will return to these factors later.
The second issue, regarding unlawful seizure, is analyzed in a similar manner.
The judge’s task is to decide whether a reasonable person in that situation would believe
that she is free to leave, or to terminate the encounter. Note that both of these tests require
courts to interpret the social meaning of behavior – to ascertain what is implicit in a
social interaction. For example, a police officer who orders a car to pull over acts with an
implicit claim of right, and so a driver or even a passenger in the car would not feel free
to leave once the car has been pulled over.6 We understand this implicitly only because
we have internalized certain norms of social behavior; a visitor from another culture
might not understand this. Similarly, when a police officer says, “May I please see your
license and registration?” we understand this utterance to be not a request, but a
command. This understanding is gleaned from our social and cultural understanding of
what a police officer means and intends when he utters those words in that context. In the
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next section, we examine more closely the ways in which contextual implicatures are
understood in ordinary conversation between people, and specifically in encounters
between police and citizens.

4. Language
Language is usually the first point of contact between police and citizen. These
encounters are dense with meaning, and fraught with the potential for deception. In the
hands of a seasoned communicator, clever use of language can gain anyone an advantage
over peers. And when that person has a badge, uniform, gun, and the power to change the
course of your days, language becomes his or her soft restraint. To appreciate the
controlling power of language, we will cover general pragmatics first; then we will turn
to its application to police encounters.

4.1. Pragmatics Basics
Language is far more than a tool for communicating descriptive facts. Language pleases
and cajoles, it scolds and questions. And when it is embedded in a cultural setting, it can
intimidate, control, or liberate. But this won’t be obvious if we only look at the
superficial structure of language. Fifty years of work in the philosophy of language has
delivered an elaborate roadmap of the origins of meaning in communication, from
posture and gesture to types of meaning, like conventional and speaker meaning. Leaving
aside phonetics and phonology, linguistics is usually carved up into three main areas:
syntax (the rules of linguistic well-formedness), semantics (the theory of meaning) and
pragmatics (the contribution of context to meaning).
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In philosophy, the chief preoccupation has been with what philosophers call “truth
functional semantics,” or the conditions that have to be met in order for descriptive
claims (normally, declarative, factual sentences) to be deemed true or false. Accordingly,
the meaning of a sentence is given by the conditions that would make it true. The
sentence “The earth has magnetic poles” is true if and only if the earth has magnetic
poles. For these kinds of statements, it doesn’t matter who says them, or how they are
said. Their meaning is entirely a function of what states of affairs would make them true.
By contrast, pragmatics takes into account the potential impact of social norms
and subtle cues that are typically expressed in language, and is informed not only by
linguistics and philosophy, but also psychology and anthropology.
Many linguistic expressions, such as commands, promises, or questions, have
meaning but not truth conditions. “Would you leave her alone?” is a question (and
interestingly, can also be a command of sorts), and has no truth conditions. In the case of
some linguistic expressions, like questions, the same person can imply different meanings
by uttering the same sentences with stress on different words. There is nothing at all
surprising or exotic about this fact. We see it in exchanges in every walk of life. In order
to see that the very same expression can provoke very different reactions, consider that
classic question: “Why did Sutton rob the bank?” Now place the accent on the capitalized
word, and note the answer, ratified by convention and common sense:
WHY did Sutton rob the bank? (He needed the money.)
Why did SUTTON rob the bank? (He was the one who needed the money.)
Why did Sutton ROB the bank? (He asked for the money nicely, but they
wouldn’t give it to him.)
Why did Sutton rob the BANK? (That’s where the money was.)
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If the appropriate answer is different for each of the questions, the implicatures of
emphasis go well beyond descriptive meaning. In addition, one has to be steeped in a
culture to know the permissible interpretations of this question as a function of stress.
The philosopher of language Paul Grice identified and characterized the
phenomenon of implicature. His theory explained and predicted what he called the
“conversational implicatures” that arise in ordinary conversations. Grice (1975)
postulated a general “Cooperative Principle,” which posits that conversational partners
cooperate with each other and will contribute what is required by the accepted purpose of
the conversation. People expect that communication will, in general, conform to this
principle, so violations can be powerfully manipulative. Any individual prepared to
deviate from this norm can exploit the listener’s unwitting expectation of cooperation.
Grice also postulated four “maxims” specifying how to be cooperative in
communication. These maxims (quantity, quality, relevance, and manner) all document
the way that subtle mechanisms of language – often together with the broader context –
can imply meanings that go beyond the sober, descriptive use of language (Grice 1975).
Using a vintage example: Imagine a friend telling you “A man came to my office” only
for you later to find that the man was her fiancé, whom you know. You assume that your
friend is being cooperative and adhering to the maxim of quantity, which specifies that a
speaker should provide enough information for purposes of a conversational exchange. If
your friend had been cooperative, she would have specified that her fiancé came by the
office. Therefore, the use of the indefinite article with a noun, “a man” creates an
implicature that the person who came to the office is not known to you (or possibly that
he is but would not be of interest to you.)
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Notice what the friend has done here. She has controlled the meaning of the
expression by saying something that is strictly true, but she has also manipulated you by
correctly predicting your reaction to her violation of selected rules of cooperative
communication. In these cases, there is little honor in merely telling the truth, because it
is not the whole truth, anything less than the whole truth will mislead, and the speaker
designed the statement with the intent to mislead. The violation of these conversational
maxims would seem a powerful tool for manipulation.

4.2. Pragmatics of Police Encounters
These pragmatic features of language play an important role in citizen-police encounters,
including vehicle stops, bus sweeps, airport stops, and street stops. In these encounters,
the police officer’s main purpose is to get information about what the person is doing,
and get permission to do something else, like search their person, house, car, bags, etc.
With the idea of pragmatic implicature now in hand, we can examine the way in
which police language can be used to deprive citizens of their sense of control. If the
police officer says or does something to diminish the citizen’s sense of control, the
citizen will not feel that consent could be refused. First, consider the contrast between
declarative statements and other kinds of utterances. Much communication is achieved
through simple declarative sentences, like “It is raining” or “Electrons have a spin of plus
or minus one half.” The meaning of declarative statements, like “The cat is on the mat” is
given by its truth-conditions. But questions don’t have truth conditions. As we
mentioned earlier, a substantial portion of communication does not invoke declarative
sentences. Indeed, what would it mean to say that a question is true? Instead, questions
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(“May I look in your bag?”), commands (“Hand over your valuables”), promises (“I
promise to repay the debt”), recommendations (“Always pay your taxes”), etc., have what
linguists and philosophers call “felicity conditions” (Austin 1962; Alston 2000).7 But
once you concede that the meaning of such utterances is not a simple function of their
truth conditions, you must examine all of the relevant contextual factors that contribute to
their meaning in order to fix their interpretation. In addition, because contextual factors
can affect meaning in limitless, even if systematic, ways, there is no sense to be made –
either scientific or folk -- of claims about the “literal meaning” of some linguistic
sequence. Its meaning can change with identity of speaker, tone and accent, location of
the utterance (church, courthouse), and a host of other indexes.

4.3. Pragmatics and Police Authority
During traffic stops, bus sweeps, and the like, the conversation between the police officer
and the citizen tends to be dominated by the kinds of utterances whose meaning varies
widely with context (Solan & Tiersma 2005). Yet, courts often analyze police encounters
as if the conversation that took place has a fixed meaning, which can be readily gleaned
without reference to the context.
One way to debunk the contention that there is some obvious, literal or
uncontested interpretation of a police officer’s request is by the following example.
Consider a backpack owner’s reaction to the same linguistic utterance, constituted by
sound alone, when delivered by a shabbily-dressed passerby. Suppose such a person stops
and says, “Would you mind if I look in your backpack?” Most people would feel freer to
refuse the shabbily dressed passerby than the person who has identified himself as a
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police officer. But if the same acoustic sequence engenders two different responses
depending upon the speaker, which is the “literal interpretation”? Another way to debunk
the contention is to imagine how the backpack owner might respond to other sorts of
communication from a police officer. Suppose a police officer says “Drop the backpack
and raise your hands in the air.” The owner obeys. Now suppose the shabbily dressed
passerby issues the same command. The owner laughs it off.
It may be rational to comply with a police officer’s command (like “put your
hands in the air”), but that doesn’t make it voluntary. We assume that the command is
backed by force. Similarly, when police use request-language, we hear this as a command
and similarly assume this is backed by force. Because people perceive discourse
originating from an authority to be coercive regardless of assertive linguistic cues,
authority figures need not use highly face-threatening language--part of that burden is
carried by the badge and gun.
People in positions of authority can control the message conveyed by linguistic
expressions in a number of ways. The cues of threat go well beyond speaker intentions.
Posture, mode of dress, physical proximity, location, identity, and authority of the
speaker all contribute to meaning. The same question may carry different force, or imply
different meanings, when uttered by different people. Suppose you are sitting on a bus,
with an empty seat next to you. Suppose further that someone approaches you and says:
“Would you like to move over?” Consider your reaction when the question is asked by
each of the following people:
1. a child
2. an adult passenger
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3. the bus driver
4. a police officer
We could explore the different implications in each case, but for the moment it is enough
to observe the difference in your reactions, and that we are quite used to sentences having
different meanings when asserted by people in different stations in life.
The meaning of social exchanges also depends on whether the speakers were
invited or unsolicited by chief parties to the exchange. When a citizen summons the
police, police presence is a welcome relief. But when officers approach uninvited, it is
seldom a happy event for the citizen. Without a clear idea of where this encounter is
going and how it will turn out, a citizen would feel irresponsible to treat this exchange
like any other. People know that they should be courteous to police, that police carry
guns and handcuffs, that they make mistakes that can cause you harm, and that additional
police are just a radio call away. They know that the police can handcuff you and take
you to the station for processing, and that it can take hours or days to sort out a
misunderstanding. So, if a police officer asks to check my backpack or luggage – even if
they inform me that I have the right to refuse – I would naturally worry that a refusal
would be viewed as grounds for suspicion.

4.4. Judicial Misunderstandings of Pragmatic Implicature in Police Encounters
Courts routinely conclude that searches that ensue during police-citizen encounters are
voluntary (Nadler 2003). To justify this conclusion, judges highlight the language of the
exchange and minimize important contextual features, like the fact that the speaker is
armed. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court has stated that when an armed police officer
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approaches and asks to search, “[t]he presence of a holstered firearm … is unlikely to
contribute to the coerciveness of the encounter absent active brandishing of the
weapon.”8
Judges often note that, in requesting consent, the officers made a request rather
than a demand. They also note that the officers used a polite tone of voice. Judges
routinely conclude that these aspects of language give rise to the inference that the citizen
was free to decline to talk to the officers or to decline the request to search. As the
Supreme Court put it, a police-civilian encounter is consensual so long as the police do
not convey a message that compliance with their request is required.9 Indeed, the
Supreme Court has lionized the kind of exchange that takes place between police and
citizens in consent searches:
In a society based on law, the concept of agreement and consent should be
given a weight and dignity of its own. Police officers act in full accord
with the law when they ask citizens for consent. It reinforces the rule of
law for the citizen to advise the police of his or her wishes and for the
police to act in reliance on that understanding. When this exchange takes
place, it dispels inferences of coercion.10
But is the Court correct that consent searches are typically characterized by the notion of
a voluntary agreement between the citizen and the officer (akin, perhaps, to two corporate
executives negotiating a licensing agreement)? Do citizens really “advise police of [their]
wishes” when they agree to searches that are devoid of probable cause? In short, is it
plausible to conclude, as the Court does, that the language of the exchange itself dispels
inferences of coercion? Contrary to the Court’s conclusion, our discussion in the previous
section suggests that this kind of police-citizen exchange heightens, rather than dispels,
inferences about coercion.
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Fortunately, not all judges advance the implausible position that consent searches
arise from a dignified understanding between citizens and police. In an early landmark
case, the police stopped a car in the middle of the night. The police asked permission to
search the car, and when they were through, the officer asked, “Does the trunk open?”
The defendant opened the trunk, and police found stolen checks. The federal court of
appeals judge was concerned that the defendant might not have realized that he had the
option of refusing the officer’s implied request to open the trunk. The judge
acknowledged that, “[u]nder many circumstances a reasonable person might read an
officer’s ‘May I’ as the courteous expression of a demand backed by force of law.”11
In bus sweep cases, too, some courts have acknowledged that passengers
approached by officers requesting permission to search might not feel free to leave or to
terminate the encounter. In one case, the Florida Supreme Court found that sheriff’s
officers who boarded the bus wearing raid jackets, blocking the aisles, and questioning
passengers about their destinations had unlawfully seized the passengers, rendering
invalid the passengers’ subsequent consent to search.12 And in other Florida bus sweep
cases, considered by federal appellate courts, judges found that reasonable passengers
would not have felt free to refuse the consent to search, because they had no indication
that consent could be refused.13
Remarkably, in each of the cases just described where the judge has recognized
the coerciveness of the police request to search, the U.S. Supreme Court has reversed the
lower court’s decision and held that there was no unlawful seizure and that consent was
freely given. The Supreme Court has made it very clear that considerations about
pragmatic implicature are to be ignored in consent search cases, no matter how
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compelling those considerations might be. Instead, it has signaled to lower courts that an
utterance phrased in the form of a question, and spoken in a polite tone, is to be
considered a request that can be freely refused, regardless of whether the context of the
conversation strongly suggests otherwise.14
Consider the following example. In the last bus sweep case mentioned above, U.S.
v. Drayton, three police officers boarded a Greyhound bus during a scheduled stopover in
Tallahassee, Florida. The driver had collected all of the passenger’s tickets and taken
them into the terminal to complete paperwork. One police officer knelt backwards in the
driver’s seat; one police officer stood at the back of the bus; and one officer began
questioning passengers. As he asked questions, the officer stood over the seated
passenger and leaned toward them, placing his face 12-18 inches from theirs. He held up
his badge and explained that he was conducting drug interdiction, and said that he would
like their cooperation. He then asked permission to search their bags.
During oral argument in the case, Justice Scalia made clear his opinion that the
police officer’s utterance was merely a request, and that the words uttered would
"counteract" contextual cues suggesting compulsion, such as the placement of one of the
officers in the driver's seat of the bus. Specifically, Justice Scalia asked, "Why ... is it that
the most immediate expression of the police officers does not counteract whatever other
indications of compulsion might exist under the circumstances? ... There's a policeman in
the front of the bus. Who cares? He . . . has made it very clear that he's asking for your
permission."15 To answer Justice Scalia’s facetious question, the bus passengers are the
ones who care, because they could not help notice the following: the driver and tickets
were absent, one police officer was now in the driver’s seat, the police had effectively
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commandeered the bus, and the bus was apparently going nowhere until the police got
what they wanted. But Justice Scalia and the rest of the majority in Drayton appear to see
things differently. Pragmatic implicature falls to the wayside, and instead an officer’s
asking of permission “counteract[s] … other indications of compulsion.” According to
this view, the authority of armed police officers simply fades away when they express
their desire to search in the form of a question.
Ever since Drayton, lower courts have had no choice but to follow the lead of the
U.S. Supreme Court. In doing so, those courts routinely and mechanically point to the
police officer’s polite tone of voice as a key basis for finding that the defendant
voluntarily consented to being searched.16 Drayton portrayed the questioning police
officer as courteous and courtly: “He spoke to passengers one by one and in a polite,
quiet voice. Nothing he said would suggest to a reasonable person that he or she was
barred from leaving the bus or otherwise terminating the encounter…. There was … no
threat, and no command, not even an authoritative tone of voice.”17
Indeed, lower courts now seem hesitant to ever find that the defendant’s grant of
consent to search was coerced, unearthing voluntariness even when the officer issues a
direct command. In one recent case, the police pulled over a car and arrested the driver
for driving without a license. The officer then asked the passenger if he had any drugs,
and asked, “Well, do you mind if I check?” The passenger did not answer and did not
gesture. The officer ordered the passenger out of the car. The passenger complied,
placing his hands in the air. The police officer then searched the passenger and found
drugs. Unbelievably, the court held that the passenger had consented voluntarily to the
search by raising his hands in the air.18 Apparently, when the officer uttered the magic
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words, “Well, do you mind if I check?” this rendered the remainder of the encounter
voluntary.
Although lower courts applying the Fourth Amendment have little choice but to
routinely find consent searches voluntary under the tightly constrained precedent that the
U.S. Supreme court has constructed, each state has its own constitution with its own
version of the Fourth Amendment. A few states interpret their own constitutions to be
more restrictive than the U.S. Constitution on matters relating to government searches
and seizures.
New Jersey courts, for example, have interpreted their state constitution to require
a higher level of scrutiny for consent searches.19 Under this standard, the prosecution
must prove that the person consenting knew that she had a choice in the matter. Further, a
police officer making a traffic stop is prohibited from requesting consent to search unless
he or she has a “reasonable and articulable suspicion” to believe that a crime is
occurring.20 The New Jersey Supreme Court acknowledged that “many persons, perhaps
most, would view the request of a police officer to make a search as having the force of
law.”21 Several other states follow a similar rule for traffic stops.22 The Supreme Court of
Hawaii has gone further and applies a similar “reasonable suspicion” rule for requesting
consent during any police encounter, not just traffic stops.23 The highest courts of these
states have each acknowledged that when a police officer says, “Do you mind if I
search?” the pragmatic implicature is often that cooperation is not just requested but
required.

5. Empirical Evidence Regarding the Language of Consent in Police Encounters
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Given the nature of police authority and the context of the citizen-police encounter, it is
highly likely that police requests to search are often interpreted as commands to permit
the search to take place. But the extent to which citizens feel compelled to accede to a
police request is an empirical question (Nadler 2003). Not much empirical evidence is
available to help answer that question. But there is some, which we will review next.
First, consider an illustration used by courts as the paradigmatic example of when
no seizure takes place: a police office approaches a citizen on a sidewalk and asks a
question. Recall that if a police officer unlawfully seizes someone, then any subsequent
search is deemed invalid. The U.S. Supreme Court has characterized this kind of
sidewalk encounter as a “perfect example of police conduct that supports no colorable
claim of seizure.”24 That is to say, the Court assumes the citizen in that situation clearly
feels free to terminate the encounter or to leave.
But do people in fact feel free to terminate that type of sidewalk encounter?
Kessler (2009) conducted a survey to find out, and it turns out the answer is mostly, no.
Respondents read a scenario in which they are walking on the sidewalk when a police
officer approaches and says, “I have a few questions to ask you.” Respondents indicated
how free they would feel to walk away or decline to talk with the officer. About half of
the respondents indicated that they would not feel free to leave in this situation.25
Remarkably, only about 20% of respondents indicated that they felt free to leave or
decline.26 Thus, most people do not in fact feel free to terminate the very type of police
encounter that the Supreme Court considers the clearest example of a completely
consensual conversation. It is clear that the Court’s conception of the level of coercion
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present in ordinary citizen-police encounters is greatly at odds with the conception of
ordinary people when they think hypothetically about interacting with police.
Moving from the hypothetical to the actual, consider next Lichtenberg’s (1999)
survey of Ohio motorists who had been stopped recently by police for traffic violations
and asked for their consent to search. Of the 54 drivers interviewed, 49 reported that they
had agreed to the request to search. Of these 49, all but two said they consented because
they were afraid of what would happen if they said no. Their fears included having their
trip unduly delayed, being searched anyway, incurring property damage to their car if
they refused, being arrested, being beaten, or being killed. Some of these concerns were
apparently well founded: of the five motorists who declined to consent to the search, two
reported being searched despite their explicit refusal to consent. Another motorist who
refused to consent was not searched but was threatened with future retaliation, which left
him so shaken that he avoids driving on the road near his home where he was stopped.
The fact that such a large percentage of this sample reported feeling afraid to
decline the officer’s request to search suggests a possible solution: require police who
request consent to search to advise citizens of their right to refuse (Solan & Tiersma
2005).27 Although on its face this requirement might seem promising, it is not a panacea.
There is no reason to believe that giving a warning would dispel the coercion inherent in
police encounters. In fact, there is empirical evidence suggesting that such warnings have
no effect on people’s willingness to refuse consent. Lichtenberg (2001) examined all
Ohio highway stops between 1995 and 1997. For part of the period studied, police were
not required to advise motorists of their right to refuse consent, and for part of the period,
police were required to do so. 28 Remarkably, the same percentage of motorists consented

20

with the warnings as without the warnings. Apparently, people are unaffected by the
warnings because they do not believe them -- they feel that they will be searched
regardless of whether or not they consent, as illustrated by the interviews just discussed.

6. Conclusion: Hollow Politeness and Its Consequences for Innocent Citizens
No one knows precisely how many innocent people are subjected to consent searches
each year, but there is little doubt that the number is staggering. One officer conducting
bus sweeps testified that he had searched 3000 bags in the previous nine months.29 In
some localities, police officers ask every motorist they stop for consent to search.30 One
officer in Ohio made, in one year, 786 requests for consent to search motorists pulled
over for routine traffic violations.31
But consent searches are not costless. People are shaken by them and don’t forget
them quickly. The vast majority of people subjected to consent searches are innocent.
This is a fact that is easily forgotten because consent searches often come to our attention
via published exclusionary rule cases, in which the defendant was factually guilty. How
do consent searches affect the lives of innocent people -- that is, people who possess no
illegal drugs or guns, are not engaged in illegal activity, yet find themselves submitting to
a search?
The Supreme Court paints a wholesome picture of a citizen and a police officer
engaging in polite conversation, in which the officer and the citizen amicably agree that
the officer is free to search her person or possessions, after which the citizen bids the
officer good day and goes on her way. But in the real world, people subjected to searches
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do not live happily ever after. The Lichtenberg (1999) survey reveals that a large majority
(76%) of citizens whose consent was requested from the Ohio Highway Patrol felt
negatively about the experience. Here are some examples:

I don't know if you ever had your house broken into or ripped off ... [it's]
an empty feeling, like you're nothing (Lichtenberg 1999:285, subject
#11091).
It was embarrassing. It pissed me off... they just treat you like a criminal
and you ain't done nothing .... I think about it every time I see a cop
(Lichtenberg 1999:283, subject #14735.)
I feel really violated. I felt like my rights had been infringed upon. I feel
really bitter about the whole thing (Lichtenberg 1999:285, subject
#15494).
I don't trust [the police] anymore. I've lost all trust in them (Lichtenberg
1999:288, subject #12731).
When police question citizens or rummage through their possessions and find
nothing, they leave in their wake a flood of shaken people. Those feelings of contingency
or personal insecurity frustrate well-being. At best, subjecting citizens to suspicionless
searches amounts to a loss of liberty. At worst, it threatens the legitimacy of the police
and the legal system more broadly (Nadler 2003; 2005). People who feel that the legal
system is worthy of respect are more likely to comply with legal rules regulating their
everyday experiences (Tyler 1991; Nadler 2005).
We have demonstrated in this chapter that the power of language and context to
intimidate is well established. By choosing to ignore the intimidating power of language
in a commanding context, the courts have adopted an interpretation of police exchanges
with citizens that favors expedience over justice, and the interests of an unsustainable war
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on drugs – politically motivated and historically datable -- over the rights of citizens,
inalienable and eternal.
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